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Does the Federal Energy Regulatory Commission (“FERC”) have authority to police manipu-
lation in financial markets if that conduct has an effect on physical markets? FERC has erroneously
argued that it possesses such authority. Adopting FERC’s view would confound the regulatory
landscape and promote duplicative and even conflicting regulation. FERC’s mission is clear: to
ensure that the rates charged for wholesale sales of natural gas and electricity are “just and reason-
able.” Its jurisdiction is limited by statute and nothing in the legislative history, prevailing case law,
or public policy suggests that Congress conferred to FERC powers to police manipulation outside
of its statutorily defined jurisdictional boundaries. Accordingly, FERC does not, and should not,
have authority to police manipulation in financial markets even if that conduct has an effect on
physical markets.
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ABSTRACT 
Does the Federal Energy Regulatory Commission (“FERC”) have 
authority to police manipulation in financial markets if that conduct 
has an effect on physical markets? 
FERC has erroneously argued that it possesses such authority.  
Adopting FERC’s view would confound the regulatory landscape 
and promote duplicative and even conflicting regulation.  FERC’s 
mission is clear: to ensure that the rates charged for wholesale sales 
of natural gas and electricity are “just and reasonable.”  Its 
jurisdiction is limited by statute and nothing in the legislative 
history, prevailing case law, or public policy suggests that Congress 
conferred to FERC powers to police manipulation outside of its 
statutorily defined jurisdictional boundaries.  Accordingly, FERC 
does not, and should not, have authority to police manipulation in 
financial markets even if that conduct has an effect on physical 
markets. 
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Does the Federal Energy Regulatory Commission (“FERC”) have 
authority to police manipulation in financial markets if that conduct has 
an effect on physical markets?  The answer depends on (i) whether 
FERC’s jurisdiction to police manipulation extends beyond the 
jurisdictional boundaries established by the Natural Gas Act of 1938 
(“NGA”) (and its corresponding provision in its sister act, the Federal 
Power Act of 1935 (“FPA”)) and, if so, (ii) whether that jurisdiction 
extends so far as to encroach upon the jurisdiction of financial markets 
(such as futures and securities) regulated by other federal agencies such 
as the Commodity Futures Trading Commission (“CFTC”) and 
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Securities Exchange Commission (“SEC”).  FERC has erroneously 
argued that it possesses such authority.1 
FERC does not possess the powers of financial regulators.  To 
conclude otherwise would confound the regulatory landscape and 
promote duplicative and even conflicting regulation.  FERC’s mission is 
clear: to ensure that the rates charged for wholesale sales of natural gas 
and electricity are “just and reasonable.”2  Its jurisdiction is limited by 
statute and nothing in the legislative history, prevailing case law, or 
public policy suggests that Congress conferred to FERC powers to 
police manipulation outside of its statutorily defined jurisdictional 
boundaries.  Accordingly, FERC does not, and should not, have 
authority to police manipulation in financial markets even if that 
conduct has an effect on physical markets. 
I. FERC’S JURISDICTION IS LIMITED TO, AND DOES NOT EXTEND 
BEYOND, THAT WHICH IS PROVIDED IN NGA §1(b) (AND ITS 
COROLLARY IN THE FPA) 
A. FERC DOES NOT HAVE AUTHORITY TO POLICE MANIPULATION  
IN FINANCIAL MARKETS BASED ON ITS HISTORICAL  
JURISDICTION AND MANDATE 
 
Since its inception, FERC and its predecessor entities have had 
limited jurisdiction and a clearly defined mandate. 3   Congress 
established FERC’s predecessor organization, the Federal Power 
Commission, in 1920 to coordinate hydroelectric projects under federal 
control.4  Congress subsequently expanded FERC’s jurisdiction with the 
passage of the FPA and the NGA to close the “Attleboro Gap”5 and 
regulate the sale and transportation of wholesale electricity and natural 
gas in interstate commerce, as well as to ensure that prices are “just and 
reasonable and not unduly discriminatory.”6  Since enactment, the NGA 
                                                                                                                                
 1. See generally Amaranth Advisors L.L.C., 121 FERC ¶ 61,224 (2007) 
[hereinafter Order Denying Rehearing] (order denying rehearing). 
 2. See 16 U.S.C. § 824d (2006); see also FERC Strategic Plan – FERC’s Mission, 
FERC, http://www.ferc.gov/about/strat-docs/strat-plan.asp (last updated Feb. 13, 2012). 
 3. See History of FERC, FERC, http://www.ferc.gov/students/ferc/history.asp 
(last visited Nov. 13, 2012). 
 4. Id. 
 5. See Pub. Util. Comm’n of R.I. v. Attleboro Steam & Elec. Co., 273 U.S. 83, 89 
(1927) (holding that the Commerce Clause prohibits state regulation that directly 
burdens interstate commerce). 
 6. History of FERC, supra note 3. 
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and FPA have been amended several times in response to regulatory 
concerns and energy crises.7  Most recently, the Energy Policy Act of 
2005 (“EPAct”) amended the NGA and FPA to address regulatory 
deficiencies that were exposed in the California energy crisis.8  Over 
time, as a result of its many amendments, FERC evolved from a rate-
setting agency into an agency with enforcement powers.9 
Before Congress enacted EPAct, FERC relied on its market 
behavior rules to police price manipulation in wholesale electric and 
natural gas transactions. 10   The market behavior rules prohibited 
“[a]ctions or transactions that [were] without a legitimate business 
purpose and that [were] intended to or foreseeably could manipulate 
market prices, market conditions, or market rules.”11  The specific types 
of transactions targeted by the anti-manipulation authority included, but 
were not limited to, wash trades, transactions based on false 
information, artificial congestion, and collusion.12 
The breadth and scope of FERC’s jurisdiction and its anti-
manipulation authority were expressly limited by NGA § 1(b) to (i) the 
transportation of natural gas in interstate commerce, (ii) the sale in 
interstate commerce of natural gas for resale, and (iii) natural gas 
companies in such transportation or sale.13  FERC’s jurisdiction did not 
reach intrastate sales, retail sales, local distribution of natural gas or 
facilities used for its distribution, or the production or gathering of 
natural gas.14   These explicitly-stated exclusions are notable because 
“Congress . . . not only prescribed the intended reach of [FERC’s] 
power, but also specified the areas into which [FERC’s] power was not 
                                                                                                                                
 7. Id. 
 8. See Energy Policy Act of 2005, Pub. L. No. 109-58,119 Stat. 594 (2005) 
(codified in scattered sections of the U.S. Code).  See also JERRY MARKHAM, 13 
COMMODITIES REGULATION: FRAUD MANIPULATION & OTHER CLAIMS § 16:10.60 
(2011). 
 9. See Paul J. Pantano, Jr. & Danielle K. Schonback, Is the FERC’s Anti-
Manipulation Jurisdiction Boundless? FUTURES & DERIVATIVES L. REP., Oct. 2007, at 
1. 
 10. See id. 
 11. Id. at n.1. 
 12. Id. 
 13. See generally William Demarest, “Traditional” NGA Jurisdictional Limits 
Constrain FERC’s Market Manipulation Authority, 31 ENERGY L.J. 471 (2010). 
 14. Id. at 481. 
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to extend.”15  In short, the NGA’s jurisdiction was limited in scope and 
FERC’s purpose clearly defined. 
Courts interpreting the scope of FERC’s authority have consistently 
held that FERC’s jurisdiction is constrained by the “limits Congress 
placed upon that power under § 1(b).”16  Thus, FERC’s exercise of its 
statutory powers is inextricably linked to whether the activities or 
persons in question fall within FERC’s regulatory jurisdiction under the 
NGA or FPA, as the case may be.  On that basis, case law dictates that 
FERC’s jurisdiction extends generally to natural gas companies and 
electric utilities. 17   Without an express Congressional authorization, 
there is no basis upon which FERC’s historical jurisdiction and statutory 
mandate may be expanded to financial markets or any other markets that 
were not contemplated by Congress.18 
B. THE ENERGY POLICY ACT OF 2005 DID NOT EMPOWER FERC TO 
POLICE MANIPULATION IN FINANCIAL MARKETS. 
EPAct was enacted in response to California’s energy crisis in 2001 
and 2002, during which wholesale energy prices were significantly 
inflated above historical levels and energy supplies were significantly 
disrupted.19  Inflated prices and energy disruptions were attributable to a 
number of factors including manipulative practices of energy traders, 
most notably Enron, which allegedly engaged in gaming practices to 
exploit regulatory and other dysfunctions in California’s rate structure.20  
Although Enron engaged in complex (and even questionable) trading 
strategies, it is not disputed that many of the transactions it executed 
involved the purchase and sale of energy in physical markets for which 
there was a delivery requirement.21  Therefore these transactions, no 
matter how complex or questionable, could theoretically fall within 
FERC’s jurisdiction if consummated in interstate commerce.  However, 
it remains debatable—even today—whether Enron engaged “in 
                                                                                                                                
 15. See Fed. Power Comm’n v. Panhandle E. Pipe Line Co., 337 U.S. 498, 503 
(1949). 
 16. See Demarest, supra note 13, at 480. 
 17. Id. 
 18. Id. at 475. 
 19. See THOMAS HAZEN & JERRY MARKHAM, 23A BROKER-DEALER OPERATIONS 
UNDER SECURITIES AND COMMODITIES LAW § 9:17.70 (2011) (discussing the California 
energy crisis and the techniques employed by Enron and other energy traders). 
 20. See id. 
 21. Id. 
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legitimate arbitrages designed to take advantage of imperfections in the 
California regulatory structure or whether its activity constituted illegal 
price manipulation and fraud”22 based upon FERC’s Market Behavior 
Rules. 
Given the fallout from the energy crisis and lingering questions 
about the legality of Enron’s activities, Congress sought broader 
prohibitions against the manipulation of energy and natural gas 
markets.23  It is not disputed that Enron purchased and resold energy in 
interstate commerce employing strategies that resulted in inflated 
prices.24  However, FERC had to consider Enron’s alleged misconduct 
in the context of the Market Behavior Rules. 25   Presumably then, 
Congress acknowledged the regulatory deficiency and intended to grant 
FERC broader powers to police manipulation beyond the limited scope 
of the Market Behavior Rules, upon which FERC had traditionally 
relied.  Considering the grant of power in this context, it is likely that 
Congress recognized that certain purchases and sales of energy that are 
within FERC’s jurisdiction would arguably not have fallen within the 
ambit of the Market Behavior Rules.  However, there is nothing in the 
legislative history or the resulting amendments to the NGA or FPA to 
suggest that the expanded powers were intended to reach beyond 
FERC’s jurisdictional boundaries, which is clearly defined in NGA § 
1(b). 
1. NGA §4A Amendments 
EPAct §315 added a new §4A to the NGA.26  The provision, in 
relevant part, provided that:  
It shall be unlawful for any entity, directly or indirectly, to use or 
employ, in connection with the purchase or sale of natural gas or the 
purchase or sale of transportation services subject to the jurisdiction 
of the Commission, any manipulative or deceptive device or 
contrivance (as those terms are used in section 10(b) of the 
Securities Exchange Act of 1934 (15 U.S.C. 78j(b)) in contravention 
of such rules and regulations as the Commission may prescribe as 
                                                                                                                                
 22. Id. 
 23. See 16 U.S.C. § 824v (2006); 15 U.S.C. § 717c-1 (2006). 
 24. See HAZEN & MARKHAM, supra note 19. 
 25. See Pantano & Schonback, supra note 9, at 1. 
 26. Energy Policy Act of 2005, sec. 315, § 4A, 119 Stat. 594, 691 (codified as 
amended at 15 U.S.C. § 717c-1 (2006)). 
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necessary in the public interest or for the protection of natural gas 
ratepayers.”27   
When adopting EPAct § 315, Congress instructed that certain key 
terms should be interpreted as they had been under § 10(b) of the 
Securities Exchange Act of 1934 (“Exchange Act”), and particularly 
Rule 10b-5, the SEC’s anti-manipulation and anti-deception rule.28  As a 
result, when FERC wrote its own rules to implement NGA § 4A, it took 
an expansive, but flawed view that it was now empowered to pursue 
“manipulative and deceptive conduct by ‘any entity,’—directly or 
indirectly—in connection with [any] jurisdictional transaction . . . .”29 
Under its own interpretation of its newly granted powers, FERC 
took the position that if conduct “affect[s] a regulated transaction in 
natural gas or electric energy (including transportation or transmission), 
the rules reach such conduct by ‘any entity’ . . . whether or not that 
entity itself is regulated by the FERC in other respects.”30  Under this 
expansive view, FERC claims that it has jurisdiction to police financial 
markets if an entity’s intentional or reckless conduct occurs outside of 
its jurisdiction but has an impact on prices within its jurisdiction. 31  
FERC misinterprets Rule 10b-5 and reaches an erroneous conclusion 
about the reach of its powers granted under NGA § 4A. 
a. NGA §4A’s Reference to “Any Entity” Only Refers to Those Entities 
Specifically Contemplated as Being Within FERC’s Jurisdiction 
FERC argues that its interpretation of “any entity” as used in NGA 
§ 4A reflects “Congress’ intent not to limit [FERC’s anti-manipulation 
powers] to traditionally NGA-jurisdictional entities.”32  FERC, however, 
offers no legislative support for its conclusion and simply reasons that if 
Congress had intended to limit the scope of FERC’s authority under 
NGA § 4A, it would have specifically identified the entities (e.g., 
“natural gas companies”) that were to be subject to FERC’s anti-
                                                                                                                                
 27. Id. 
 28. See Order Denying Rehearing, supra note 1, at 62,069–70. 
 29. See FERC Prohibition of Natural Gas Market Manipulation, 18 C.F.R. § 1c.1 
(2012); see also Allan Horwich, Warnings to the Unwary: Multi-Jurisdictional Federal 
Enforcement of Manipulation and Deception in the Energy Markets After the Energy 
Policy Act of 2005, 27 ENERGY L.J. 363, 385 (2006). 
 30. Horwich, supra note 29, at 385. 
 31. Id. at 386–87. 
 32. Demarest, supra note 13, at 488. 
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manipulation jurisdiction rather than using the phrase “any entity.”33  
Since Congress did not specifically enumerate or define those entities, 
then, according to FERC, its anti-manipulation authority applies to any 
and all entities. 
FERC’s interpretation of Congress’ silence is misplaced.  If 
Congress had used a defined term, it may have resulted in a class of 
covered entities smaller than the universe of NGA-jurisdictional entities 
that were contemplated in the NGA’s jurisdictional provision, § 1(b).  
Furthermore, a narrowly defined term might fail to capture certain 
existing businesses in the transportation and sales chain or new business 
not yet envisioned that, once created, would otherwise have fallen 
within the class of covered entities. 
Before the enactment of EPAct, NGA § 1(b) provided that FERC’s 
powers applied, for example, to natural gas transportation companies, 
sellers, and resellers in interstate commerce. 34   However, EPAct 
amended NGA § 1(b) to also cover persons engaged in “the importation 
or exportation of natural gas in foreign commerce.”35  Had Congress not 
used more expansive language, these newly covered “persons” and 
possibly some of the entities that are explicitly listed in FERC’s 
jurisdictional provision, would not have been subject to the new anti-
manipulation powers.36  Thus, Congress likely intended to expand the 
scope of the entities subject to FERC’s anti-manipulation authority, but 
only to the extent of those jurisdictional entities contemplated prior to 
the enactment of EPAct, as well as those entities engaged in the 
importation and exportation of natural gas in foreign commerce.  The 
legislative history of EPAct does not suggest that Congress intended 
more. 37   Therefore, attempts by FERC to regulate “any entity,” 
including those operating in financial markets, reach well beyond 
FERC’s congressionally-authorized jurisdictional boundaries. 
                                                                                                                                
 33. Id. 
 34. Id. at 480. 
 35. Natural Gas Act § 1, 15 U.S.C. § 717(b) (2006). 
 36. See Demarest, supra note 13, at 488–89. 
 37. Id. at 495.  
2013] FERC AND ANTI-MANIPULATION AUTHORITY 387 
b. FERC’s Reliance on the SEC’s Rule 10b-5 and its Interpretation of 
“in Connection with” are Overly Broad 
FERC has interpreted “in connection with” to mean that it has 
broad jurisdiction over entities that engage in conduct affecting its 
subject matter jurisdiction.38  In other words, FERC seeks to assert its 
jurisdiction wherever “there is a ‘nexus’ between the manipulative 
conduct and [a FERC] jurisdictional transaction.”39   Thus, based on 
FERC’s interpretation, it would have authority to assert jurisdiction over 
“conduct [in financial markets] that has only a tenuous, if any, tie to 
what the FPA and NGA delineate as FERC-jurisdictional 
transactions.”40 
To reach its conclusion, FERC relied heavily upon the Exchange 
Act, specifically § 10(b) and Rule 10b-5, as well as their judicial 
precedents.41  However, FERC’s analysis of § 10(b) and Rule 10b-5, and 
its determination regarding its applicability to the NGA, is flawed on 
several grounds: (i) FERC’s interpretation of  “in connection with” is 
inconsistent with the use of the phrase in other sections of the NGA; (ii) 
courts have rejected FERC’s view that the “in connection with” standard 
allows it to assert jurisdiction over parties engaging in conduct outside 
of its jurisdiction; and (iii) the U.S. Supreme Court has adopted a broad 
interpretation of the phrase “in connection with” in Rule 10b-5, but has 
explicitly required that the fraud must be coincident to a sale of 
securities to prevail on a § 10(b) claim.42 
First, FERC’s interpretation of “in connection with” is not 
consistent with the use of the phrase in other sections of the NGA.43  
Contrary to FERC’s assertion, the phrase “in connection with” does not 
grant FERC power to police manipulation beyond its jurisdictional 
boundaries. 44   This view is consistent with the court’s conclusion 
reached in Conoco Inc. v. FERC.45  In Conoco, the court considered the 
                                                                                                                                
 38. See Order Denying Rehearing, supra note 1, at 62,072. 
 39. Pantano & Schonback, supra note 9, at 3. 
 40. Id. at 2. 
 41. See generally Order Denying Rehearing, supra note 1, at 62,074–76. 
 42. SEC v. Zandford, 535 U.S. 813, 820–22 (2002). 
 43. See Brief of Petitioner at 52–55, Hunter v. FERC, 403 F. App’x 525 (D.C. Cir. 
2010) (No. 10-1017), 2010 WL 5779115, at *37–40 [hereinafter In re Hunter Petitioner 
Brief]. 
 44. Id. at 53. 
 45. 90 F.3d 536 (D.C. Cir. 1996).  
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phrase “in connection with” that appears elsewhere in the NGA. 46  
FERC argued that the language authorized it to “regulate facilities that it 
has expressly found are not within its [NGA] §1 (b) jurisdiction.”47  The 
court rejected FERC’s argument and held that “the ‘in connection with’ 
language . . . neither expand[s] [FERC’s] jurisdiction, nor override[s] 
[NGA] §1 (b) . . . .”48 
Second, courts have rejected FERC’s view that the “in connection 
with” standard used in § 10(b) allows FERC to assert jurisdiction over 
parties engaging in conduct outside of its jurisdiction.  For example, in 
Ontario Public Service Employees Union Pension Trust Fund v. Nortel 
Networks Corp., 49  the court rejected arguments that the anti-
manipulation provisions of § 10(b) covered purchases and sales of 
“any” securities even though the statute was “intended to be construed 
flexibly.50  Instead, the court held that the alleged misrepresentation by 
one company that merely “affected” the price of another company’s 
securities was insufficient to give the plaintiffs standing to sue under § 
10(b) or Rule 10b-5.51  Employing the § 10(b) or Rule 10b-5 standard in 
the context of energy markets presumably would yield the same result.  
In other words, misconduct that occurs in financial markets and 
incidentally affects prices within energy markets would be well beyond 
the intended reach of the statute. 
Equally compelling are the findings of the court in Leykin v. AT&T 
Corp.,52 which explained that “[n]ot all conduct that negatively affects a 
company’s stock price is actionable as a federal securities fraud.  The 
scheme to defraud must coincide with the sale of the securities.”53  The 
court further noted that “[c]onduct that is merely incidental or 
tangentially related to the sale of securities will not meet the ‘in 
connection with’ requirement.”54 
Third, the Supreme Court has adopted a broad interpretation of the 
phrase “in connection with” in Rule 10b-5, but has explicitly required 
                                                                                                                                
 46. Id. at 552. 
 47. In re Hunter Petitioner Brief, supra note 43, at 52–53. 
 48. Id. 
 49. 369 F.3d 27 (2d Cir. 2004). 
 50. Id. at 32. 
 51. Id. at 34; see Pantano & Schonback, supra note 9, at 3. 
 52. 423 F. Supp. 2d 229, 241 (S.D.N.Y. 2006). 
 53. Id. (citing SEC v. Zandford, 535 U.S. 813, 822 (2002)). 
 54. Id. (citing Ling v. Deutsche Bank, AG, No. 04 Civ. 4566 (HB), 2005 WL 
1244689, at *6 (S.D.N.Y. May 26, 2005)). 
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that the fraud be coincident to a sale of securities.55  FERC relies upon 
SEC v. Zandford for the proposition that § 10(b) should be construed in 
a broad and flexible manner to accomplish the far-reaching and remedial 
purpose of the statute. 56  FERC, however, fails to point out that the 
Court asserted that the application of § 10(b) and Rule 10b-5 is not 
without limit. 57   Critically, the Supreme Court cautioned “that ‘in 
connection with’ must not be construed so broadly as to convert every 
common-law fraud that happens to involve securities into a violation of 
§ 10(b).”58  In United States v. O’Hagan,59 the Supreme Court stated that 
the requisite showing is “deception ‘in connection with the purchase or 
sale of any security,’ not deception of an identifiable purchaser or 
seller.”60  Thus, applying § 10(b) to natural gas transactions—rather than 
to securities—means that FERC’s authority to police manipulation must 
be coincident to a sale of natural gas. 61   Transactions in financial 
markets are independent of physical markets and, therefore, are not 
coincident to sales of natural gas.62  Accordingly, FERC’s reliance on § 
10(b) does not provide a basis for it to gain jurisdiction over financial 
markets, even if there is an incidental impact on physical markets.63 
 
C. FERC’S INTERPRETATION AND APPLICATION OF ORDER 670  
ARE ULTRA VIRES 
 
Order 670, § 1.c.1 codifies for rulemaking purposes FERC’s 
prohibition of natural gas market manipulation based on its 
interpretation of the NGA § 4A amendment.64  A corollary provision is 
provided for the purchase and sale of electricity in § 1.c.2 for the FPA § 
222 amendment. 65   FERC claims that the language of its own 
                                                                                                                                
 55. SEC v. Zandford, 535 U.S. 813 (2002); see Leykin, 423 F. Supp. 2d at 241. 
 56. See Order Denying Rehearing, supra note 1, at 62,074–75 (citing Zandford, 
535 U.S. at 819 & Superintendant of Ins. of the State of N.Y. v. Bankers Life & Cas. 
Co., 404 U.S. 6, 10 (1971)). 
 57. Zandford, 535 U.S. at 820.  
 58. Id. 
 59. 521 U.S. 642 (1997). 
 60. Id. at 658. 
 61. See generally In re Hunter Petitioner Brief, supra note 43, at *40. 
 62. Id. 
 63. Id. 
 64. Prohibition of Energy Market Manipulation, 18 C.F.R. § 1c.2 (2012). 
 65. See Philip H. Hilder & Scott L. Mullins, Attack of the Clone: FERC’s Anti-
Manipulation Rule Uses SEC Tools, in AN ABA-CLE PUBLICATION ON WHITE COLLAR 
CRIME 2008, at K-2 (2008); see also Demarest, supra note 13, at 482. 
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rulemaking expands its jurisdictional reach beyond its statutory 
boundaries and allows it to reach behavior in financial markets that has 
an impact on physical markets.66  However, FERC’s argument is not 
persuasive.  If the NGA and FPA are limited in scope, so too are rules 
adopted by FERC to codify Congress’ statutory mandate.67  “One of the 
most revered principles of administrative law, after all, is that an agency 
cannot . . . extend the reach of its jurisdiction beyond that encompassed 
by statute.” 68   Accordingly, without a corresponding amendment to 
NGA § 1(b) (and the corresponding provision in the FPA) to expand 
FERC’s jurisdiction, FERC’s interpretation and application of Order 
670 was made in excess of its delegated powers and is therefore ultra 
vires.69  
II. EVEN IF FERC’S JURISDICTION EXTENDS BEYOND THE 
BOUNDARIES OF NGA §1(B) (AND ITS COROLLARY IN THE FPA), IT 
DOES NOT EXTEND SO FAR AS TO ENCROACH UPON THE JURISDICTION 
OF FINANCIAL MARKETS REGULATED BY OTHER FEDERAL AGENCIES, 
EVEN IF CONDUCT HAS AN EFFECT ON PHYSICAL MARKETS 
A. THE CFTC HAS EXCLUSIVE JURISDICTION OVER FUTURES 
TRANSACTIONS 
Prior to 1974, multiple state and federal agencies regulated 
commodities futures trading.70  As a result, market participants were 
often subjected to conflicting regulations and agency rulings. 71   To 
minimize duplicative oversight and conflicting rulings, Congress 
enacted the Commodity Futures Trading Commission Act of 1974 
(which amended the Commodity Exchange Act of 1936 (“CEA”)), to (a) 
create and centralize the regulation of futures with the CFTC; (b) 
empower the CFTC with exclusive jurisdiction over futures transactions 
and futures contracts; and (c) state in plain terms that the CFTC’s 
                                                                                                                                
 66. See generally Amaranth Advisors L.L.C., 120 FERC ¶ 61,085 (2007) (order to 
show cause). 
 67. See Hilder & Mullins, supra note 65, at K-3. 
 68. See Sharon Brown-Hruska & Robert Zwirb, CFTC & FERC vs. Amaranth: 
Doing the Sister Regulator Act, FUTURES & DERIVATIVES L. REP., Oct. 2007, at 1. 
 69. See Griffith v. Fed. Labor Relations Auth., 842 F.2d 487, 492–94 (D.C. Cir. 
1988); see also In re Hunter Petitioner Brief, supra note 43, at 35. 
 70. See 120 CONG. REC. S16, 127–28 (daily ed. Sept. 9, 1974). 
 71. See In re Hunter Petitioner Brief, supra note 43, at 25. 
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jurisdiction over futures transactions and futures contracts markets 
preempts other state and federal regulatory authorities. 72   Thus, 
Congress was clear about the breadth and scope of the CFTC’s 
jurisdiction.  The plain language of the statutory text, its legislative 
history, and over thirty-five years of case law leaves little doubt that 
Congress intended to and did in fact confer upon the CFTC exclusive 
jurisdiction over futures transactions.  Therefore, any claims by FERC 
that it has any jurisdiction whatsoever over futures transactions is 
inconsistent with Congress’ intent. 
1. The Statutory Text of CEA § 2(a)(1)(A) Is Explicit and Clear 
The Supreme Court has stated that its “analysis begins with the 
language of the statute.  And where the statutory language provides a 
clear answer, it ends there as well.”73  CEA § 2(a)(1)(A) provides, in 
pertinent part, that the CFTC shall have “exclusive jurisdiction . . . with 
respect to accounts, agreements . . . and transactions involving” futures 
contracts “traded or executed” on CFTC-licensed exchanges, called 
designated contracts.74  The plain reading of the statute makes it clear 
that Congress granted to the CFTC exclusive jurisdiction over futures 
transactions. 
FERC has acknowledged the CFTC’s exclusive jurisdiction over 
futures transactions, but seeks to distinguish manipulative futures 
trading as not falling within that exclusive jurisdiction. 75   FERC’s 
argument is, however, without merit.  Industry Associations agree that 
where “Congress intended to limit the broad grant of [the] CFTC[‘s] 
exclusive jurisdiction, it expressly” did so by amending the CEA.76  For 
example, Congress explicitly granted to the SEC authority over certain 
kinds of options77  and security futures products.78   Significantly, the 
                                                                                                                                
 72. Commodity Futures Trading Commission Act of 1974 § 101(a)(1), 7 U.S.C. § 
2(a)(1)(A) (2006). 
 73. Hughes Aircraft Co. v. Jacobson, 525 U.S. 432, 438 (1999) (internal citations 
omitted). 
 74. Commodity Exchange Act of 1936 § 2(a)(1)(A), 7 U.S.C. § 2(a)(1)(a) (2006). 
 75. See Corrected Amicus Curiae Brief of Futures Industry Association et al. in 
Support of Petitioner & Intervenor at 24, Hunter v. FERC, 403 F. App’x 525 (D.C. Cir. 
2010) (No. 10-1017), 2010 WL 5779118, at *14 [hereinafter Amicus Curiae Brief of 
Futures Industry Association]. 
 76. Id. at 25. 
 77. Commodity Exchange Act § 2(a)(1)(C). 
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express grant of authority to the SEC came only after it settled 
jurisdictional differences with the CFTC.79  Before those jurisdictional 
differences were settled, courts recognized that futures and securities 
markets were converging, yet repeatedly held that even where the 
underlying commodity was a security, the CFTC maintained jurisdiction 
over futures transactions.80  Even in situations where the SEC disagreed 
with how the CFTC regulated the futures markets, the courts suggested 
that any such concerns were not the SEC’s business, but rather a matter 
for Congress.81  It was only following a series of studies, negotiations, 
and settlements that Congress eventually confirmed the CFTC’s 
authority over options and security futures products, while granting veto 
authority to the SEC over new stock index futures contracts approved by 
the CFTC. 82   “Notably, Congress has never enacted an explicit 
exemption [or carve-out] from [the CFTC’s] exclusive jurisdiction [in 
favor of] FERC as it did for the SEC . . . .”83  In accordance with 
prevailing practices, “[i]n circumstances where Congress has enacted an 
explicit exemption for one agency, but not other agencies, courts should 
not read into the statute an exemption for those agencies.”84 
2. Legislative History Leaves No Doubt About Congress’ Intent 
The statutory text granting exclusive jurisdiction to the CFTC is 
clear and unambiguous, and its exceptions and exclusions are explicitly 
stated.85  However, if there remains any doubt about the breadth and 
scope of the CFTC’s jurisdiction, the legislative history is replete with 
evidence of Congress’ intent. 86   Specifically, when the 1974 
amendments were enacted, the Conference Committee, Senate 
Chairman and House Committee Chairman were all in agreement in 
                                                                                                                                
 78. Commodity Exchange Act § 2(a)(1)(D); see id. § 2(c) (carving out an 
exemption for non-retail foreign currency transactions through the Treasury 
Amendment). 
 79. See Jerry Markham, Merging the SEC & CFTC – A Clash of Cultures, 78 U. 
CIN. L. REV. 537, 570 (2009). 
 80. See id. 
 81. See id. at 574 & n.205 (citing Bd. of Trade v. SEC, 187 F.3d 713 (7th Cir. 
1999). 
 82. Id. at 569–71. 
 83. Amicus Curiae Brief of Futures Industry Association, supra note 75, at 27. 
 84. United States v. Vonn, 535 U.S. 55, 65 (2002). 
 85. Commodity Exchange Act § 2(a)(1)(A). 
 86. H.R. REP. NO. 93-1383 (1974) (Conf. Rep.). 
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echoing Congress’ intent to confer exclusive jurisdiction upon the 
CFTC.87 
The Conference Committee articulated that “the [CFTC]’s 
jurisdiction over futures contract markets . . . is exclusive . . . and the 
[CFTC]’s jurisdiction, where applicable, supersedes State as well as 
Federal agencies.” 88   Furthermore, “[u]nder the exclusive grant of 
jurisdiction to the [CFTC], the authority of the [CEA] . . . would 
preempt the field insofar as futures regulation is concerned.”89  The 
Senate Committee Chairman asserted that by “establishing [the CFTC], 
it [was] the Committee’s intent to give it exclusive jurisdiction over 
those areas delineated in the [CEA].”90  The objective, he explained, was 
to “assure that the affected entities—exchanges, traders, customers, et 
cetera—will not be subject to conflicting agency rulings.” 91   House 
Committee Chairman Poage underscored the point, stating that the 
provision was adopted “in an attempt to avoid unnecessary, overlapping 
and duplicative regulation.”92 
Given the plain meaning of the statutory text and the clarity with 
which the legislative history reflects Congress’ intent, it is clear that the 
CFTC’s jurisdiction is exclusive.  Accordingly, other federal agencies, 
such as FERC, may not encroach upon that jurisdiction without express 
Congressional authorization.  Courts agree with this view, having 
repeatedly recognized and reaffirmed the CFTC’s exclusive 
jurisdiction.93 
3. Case Law Confirms CFTC’s Exclusive Jurisdiction 
Decades of case law strongly support the conclusion that the 
CFTC’s exclusive jurisdiction over futures markets is indisputable.  The 
prevailing view is that “[a]ll U.S. futures trading in all goods and articles 
(except onions), including sources of energy, like natural gas, is subject 
                                                                                                                                
 87. Id. 
 88. Id. at 35. 
 89. Id. 
 90. 120 CONG. REC. 30,459 (1974) (statement of Sen. Comm. Chairman 
Talmadge); see id. at 34,736. 
 91. Id. at 30,459. 
 92. Id. at 34,736 (statement of H. Comm. Chairman Poage). 
 93. SEC v. Am. Commodity Exch., Inc., 546 F.2d 1361 (10th Cir. 1976); FTC v. 
Ken Roberts Co., 276 F.3d 583 (D.C. Cir. 2001); Bd. of Trade of Chi. v. SEC, 677 F.2d 
1137 (7th Cir. 1982); Chicago Mercantile Exch. v. SEC, 883 F.2d 537 (7th Cir. 1989). 
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to the CEA’s regulatory apparatus.”94  It does not matter whether the 
underlying instrument would, on a stand-alone basis, be subject to the 
jurisdiction of another agency.95  In fact, at least one court has held that 
the existence of futures is a “zero-sum game” because of the CFTC’s 
exclusivity.96   The court stated: “an instrument either is or is not a 
futures contract.  If it is, the CFTC has jurisdiction; if it is not, the CFTC 
lacks jurisdiction; if the CFTC has jurisdiction, its power is exclusive.”97 
FERC has argued that the CFTC does not have exclusive 
jurisdiction over manipulative conduct involving futures.98  In support of 
its position, FERC relies heavily upon FTC v. Ken Roberts Co. 
(“Roberts”)99 and points to the court’s comment that “while the CFTC 
has the clear statutory authority to regulate a [trader’s] deceitful 
‘practices’ . . . there is no reason to think that this authority is exclusive.  
A ‘practice’ or ‘course of business’ is quite plainly not a ‘transaction’ . . 
. [as contemplated by the statute].”100  FERC’s reliance on the court’s 
comment in isolation is misleading and fails entirely when considering 
the facts of Roberts and the court’s decision.101  Roberts in fact supports 
the argument that the CFTC’s exclusive jurisdiction applies to all actual 
futures trading and all transactions involving futures. 102   The court 
distinguished marketing materials relating to futures from the actual 
trading of futures.103  The marketing materials that were the subject of 
the ‘practice’ and ‘course of business’ referred to in that case were 
determined to be outside the exclusive jurisdiction of the CFTC. 104  
However, the court was decisive in explaining that “a set of actions 
closely linked to the actual trading of commodities” falls squarely within 
the CFTC’s jurisdiction. 105   Thus, whenever there is a transaction 
                                                                                                                                
 94. Amicus Curiae Brief of Futures Industry Association, supra note 75, at 16 
(citation omitted). 
 95. Id. at 34. 
 96. Chicago Mercantile Exch., 883 F.2d at 547. 
 97. Id. 
 98. Order Denying Rehearing, supra note 1, at 62,068. 
 99. 276 F.3d 583 (D.C. Cir. 2001). 
 100. Id. at 591. 
 101. See Amicus Curiae Brief of Futures Industry Association, supra note 75, at 30–
31. 
 102. FTC v. Ken Roberts Co., 276 F.3d 583 (D.C. Cir. 2001). 
 103. Id. at 589–91.  
 104. Id. at 591–92. 
 105. Id. at 591. 
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involving futures contracts, the CFTC’s jurisdiction supersedes that of 
any other agency claiming that it has jurisdiction.106 
4. The “Enron Loophole” 
Through exemptions and exclusions, Congress has carved out 
certain products and transactions from most requirements of the CEA.107  
In addition to those exemptions discussed earlier for certain options and 
securities futures products, Congress has excluded or exempted certain 
categories of other commodities and transactions that could be legally 
traded in over-the-counter (OTC) markets, subjecting them to varying 
degrees of regulation and in some cases, minimal CFTC oversight.108  
One of those exemptions, codified in CEA §2(h)(3), allowed for 
substantial volumes of trading in OTC energy contracts and provided the 
basis for the alleged misconduct by Enron Corporation and Amaranth 
Advisers.109 
a. The Origin of the Enron Loophole 
Prior to 2000, a number of hybrid products were created that 
contained futures-like characteristics but also contained elements of 
other financial instruments that were traditionally outside of the CFTC’s 
jurisdiction.110  Many of these products were not exchange-traded and 
were utilized by market participants in bilateral transactions. 111   As 
discussed earlier, some of these new products led to jurisdictional 
battles, for example, between the CFTC and SEC. 112   Absent an 
exemption or exclusion, these new products—if determined to be 
subject to the CFTC’s jurisdiction—would have been subject to the 
CFTC’s exchange trading requirement.113  Market participants argued, 
however, that an exchange-trading requirement would have resulted in 
                                                                                                                                
 106. See Bd. of Trade of Chi. v. SEC, 677 F.2d 1137 (7th Cir. 1982); see also 
Chicago Mercantile Exch. v. SEC, 883 F.2d 537 (7th Cir. 1989). 
 107. See generally MARK JICKLING, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., RS22912, THE ENRON 
LOOPHOLE 2 (2008). 
 108. Id. 
 109. Id. 
 110. Id. 
 111. Id. 
 112. See Markham, supra note 79, at 570. 
 113. See Pantano & Schonback, supra note 9, at 4. 
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an economic burden that would have outweighed the social utility of the 
products.114 
In Transnor (Bermuda) Ltd. v. B.P. North American Petroleum,115 
the court concluded that the hybrid products were in fact subject to the 
CFTC’s jurisdiction and therefore subject to the CEA’s exchange-
trading requirements as well.116   However, the court recognized that 
most users of the hybrid products were sophisticated parties who do not 
need the same level of protection as sophisticated parties.117  Weighing 
the social utility of the products against the costs borne by market 
participants if the products were required to be exchange-traded, 
Congress enacted the Futures Trading Practices Act of 1992 (“FTPA”) 
giving the CFTC authority to exempt various energy contracts and 
hybrid instruments from the CFTC’s jurisdiction.118  Once the CFTC 
granted the exemption, market participants were able to enter into 
bilateral contracts in OTC transactions without the costs of their 
exchange-traded counterparts.119 
As the OTC market grew, the CFTC sought greater authority to 
police those markets. 120   Congress, however, did not believe that 
additional oversight was necessary and enacted the Commodity Futures 
Modernization Act of 2000 (“CFMA”), which exempted “two classes of 
transactions from most substantive CFTC regulation.  First, bilateral 
contracts between ‘eligible contract participants’ that are not executed 
on a trading facility . . . .  Second, contracts in exempt commodities 
between ‘eligible commercial entities’ that are executed on an 
‘electronic trading facility’.”121   Congress presumed that “most OTC 
financial derivatives were not susceptible to manipulation and that the 
counterparties in such transactions did not need the same protections as 
smaller, unsophisticated market participants who relied on 
intermediaries to conduct their transactions.”122 
                                                                                                                                
 114. See Markham, supra note 79, at 574–75. 
 115. 738 F. Supp. 1472 (S.D.N.Y. 1990). 
 116. Id. at 1493. 
 117. Id. at 1492. 
 118. See Markham, supra note 79, at 575 (citing the Futures Trading Practices Act 
of 1992, Pub. L. No. 102-546, § 502, 106 Stat. 3590, 3629 (1992)). 
 119. Id. at 575, 580–81. 
 120. Id. at 580–81. 
 121. MARK JICKLING, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., RS22912, THE ENRON LOOPHOLE 2 
(2008). 
 122. Markham, supra note 79, at 581. 
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When Enron collapsed in 2001, it had allegedly exploited the 
exemptions by trading considerable amounts of physical energy and 
derivatives contracts on OTC electronic markets.123  The exemptions 
subsequently became known as the “Enron Loophole,” presumably 
because it allowed for significant levels of trading in futures outside the 
purview of the CFTC.124 
b. The Enron Loophole Has Been Closed 
Amaranth Advisers, LLC was a large hedge fund whose primary 
business was investing in speculative energy trades on The New York 
Mercantile Exchange (“NYMEX”). 125   NYMEX is a futures trading 
exchange registered with, and regulated by, the CFTC.126  Concerned 
with the potential for large losses, NYMEX required Amaranth to 
reduce its positions on the exchange. 127   Amaranth complied, but 
allegedly engaged in regulatory arbitrage by taking advantage of the 
Enron Loophole to shift its positions to an OTC exempt contract market 
(“ECM”) known as the Intercontinental Exchange (“ICE”). 128   Like 
Enron, Amaranth subsequently collapsed and lost $6 billion as a result 
of questionable trading practices.129 
Responding to Enron and Amaranth, Congress enacted the CFTC 
Reauthorization Act of 2008 (also known as the “ICE Amendments”).130  
The ICE Amendments modified CEA § 2(h) “to provide for CFTC 
regulation of electronic trading facilities that offer ‘significant price 
discovery contracts’ in exempt commodities.” 131   Significant price 
discovery contracts are those:  
                                                                                                                                
 123. Id. at 586. See also HAZEN & MARKHAM, supra note 19; MARK JICKLING, 
CONG. RESEARCH SERV., RS22912, THE ENRON LOOPHOLE (2008). 
 124. See Markham, supra note 79, at 586. 
 125. See generally Amaranth Advisors L.L.C., 120 FERC ¶ 61,085 (2007) (order to 
show cause); see also Markham, supra note 79, at 583–84. 
 126. Commodity Exchange Act § 5. 
 127. See Markham, supra note 79, at 600. 
 128. Id. 
 129. Id. 
 130. The CFTC Reauthorization Act of 2008 was enacted as Title XIII of the Food, 
Conservation, and Energy Act of 2008, Pub. L. No. 110-246, §§ 13101–13204, 122 
Stat. 923, 1427–1442 (2008).  The Act is often referred to as the “Farm Bill.”  
 131. MARK JICKLING, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., RS22912, THE ENRON LOOPHOLE 4 
(2008). 
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(i) [W]ith a settlement price linked to a regulated market’s contract, 
(ii) that may be the subject of arbitrage trading involving exchange-
listed contracts, (iii) that are traded in sufficient volume to have an 
effect on other market prices, or (iv) that are used as a reference 
point for pricing transactions in other markets.  Once the CFTC 
determines that a contract meets one or more of these criteria, the 
electronic trading facility becomes subject to exchange-like 
regulation.132  
In its action against Amaranth, FERC argued that the CFTC did not 
have exclusive jurisdiction over manipulation in cases involving exempt 
commodities.133  The primary basis for FERC’s claim of jurisdiction and 
its action against Amaranth was that Amaranth’s trading practices had a 
direct link to the prices of natural gas in physical markets.134  Given 
Congress’ explicit requirement to include “significant price discovery 
contracts” in exempt commodities within the scope of the CFTC’s 
exclusive jurisdiction, FERC would have no basis whatsoever to make 
such claims against Amaranth if the ICE Amendments were in place at 
the time of Amaranth’s alleged misconduct.135  However, the fact that 
the ICE Amendments were enacted after Amaranth’s alleged 
misconduct presumably could have raised the question of whether the 
CFTC had jurisdiction over the alleged misconduct before the ICE 
Amendments. 
FERC’s rationale is based on the fact that under the CFMA, the 
CFTC had little substantive regulatory authority over exempt 
commodities and excluded commodities traded on ECMs.136  Indeed, the 
ECMs were relieved of most registration, reporting, and certain other 
substantive requirements.137  FERC, however, failed to acknowledge that 
the CFTC maintained authority over fraudulent and manipulative 
conduct arising in exempt markets for exempt and excluded 
commodities.138  Therefore, the CFTC, not FERC, had jurisdiction over 
                                                                                                                                
 132. Id. 
 133. Order Denying Rehearing, supra note 1, at 62,077–78. 
 134. See generally Amaranth Advisors L.L.C., 120 FERC ¶ 61,085 (2007) (order to 
show cause); see also Markham, supra note 79, at 583–84. 
 135. See MARK JICKLING, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., RS22912, THE ENRON 
LOOPHOLE 4 (2008). 
 136. See id. at 3. 
 137. Id.; see Markham, supra note 79, at 582. 
 138. Horwich, supra note 29, at 374. 
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Amaranth’s alleged manipulative conduct occurring on the regulated 
NYMEX, as well as the exempt contract market, ICE. 
5. CFTC/FERC Memorandum of Understanding Neither Limits CFTC’s 
Jurisdiction, Nor Expands FERC’s Jurisdiction 
Before the CFTC and SEC resolved their jurisdictional dispute over 
options and security futures products, Congress required that the CFTC 
“maintain communications” with the SEC and other federal authorities 
because it recognized that futures and securities markets had become 
somewhat intertwined. 139  That requirement, however, did not divest the 
CFTC of its exclusive jurisdiction over those products, nor did it grant 
to the SEC an expanded jurisdiction or additional powers. 140   Until 
Congress provided an explicit exception for the SEC over certain 
options and security futures products, jurisdiction remained with the 
CFTC.141 
Similarly, Congress mandated that the CFTC and FERC enter into 
a memorandum of understanding (“MOU”) pursuant to which the 
parties were required to communicate, share information, and coordinate 
investigations.142  More specifically, “the MOU requires the agencies to 
coordinate their discovery requests; to share information; maintain 
confidentiality [in most instances]; and to meet regularly.” 143   In 
addition, each agency is required to refer to the other potential violations 
that are within the jurisdiction of the other agency.144  According to the 
Congressional mandate and the specific terms of the MOU, there is no 
basis to suggest that Congress intended to alter either agency’s 
jurisdiction.145  To the contrary, Congress recognizes the independent 
jurisdiction of each agency and requires them to communicate and share 
information in the same manner that was required to resolve earlier 
                                                                                                                                
 139. Markham, supra note 79, at 569. 
 140. Brown-Hruska & Zwirb, supra note 68, at 5–6. 
 141. Id. 
 142. Memorandum of Understanding Between the FERC and CFTC Regarding 
Information Sharing and Treatment of Proprietary Trading and Other Information (Oct. 
12, 2005), available at http://www.ferc.gov/legal/maj-ord-reg/mou.asp. See Press 
Release, CFTC, CFTC Chairman Jeffrey and FERC Chairman Kelliher Sign MOU on 
Information Sharing, Confidentiality (Oct. 12, 2005), available at www.cftc.gov/opa/ 
press05/opa5127-05.htm. 
 143. See Hilder & Mullins, supra note 65, at K-4. 
 144. HAZEN & MARKHAM, supra note 19, at 3. 
 145. Brown-Hruska & Zwirb, supra note 68, at 6. 
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jurisdictional disputes between the CFTC and the SEC. 146   The 
jurisdictional lines were not re-drawn as a result of the mandate to 
“maintain communications,” 147  and contrary to FERC’s assertions, 
FERC’s jurisdiction has not been expanded as a result of the MOU. 
Accordingly, the MOU does not empower FERC to pursue any and 
all claims of manipulation simply because such conduct may have had 
an impact on prices in physical markets.  The more prudent view is that 
the information sharing requirement equips FERC with additional tools 
to (i) ensure that rates within its jurisdiction are “just and reasonable” 
and “not unduly discriminatory,” and (ii) pursue manipulation that 
occurs in the purchase or sale of physical energy in interstate commerce, 
as well as that which occurs in the importation and exportation of 
natural gas in foreign commerce.  FERC’s jurisdiction has not been 
expanded to permit an encroachment upon the jurisdiction of other 
federal agencies.148  If manipulation or wrongful conduct occurs in a 
market regulated by another federal agency but has an impact on prices 
in physical energy markets, FERC’s recourse, responsibility, and 
Congressional mandate is to correct the artificial price movements to 
ensure they are just and reasonable and not unduly discriminatory.149 
B. THE SEC HAS JURISDICTION OVER SECURITIES MARKETS 
Whereas the CFTC has exclusive jurisdiction over futures markets, 
the SEC has jurisdiction over securities markets.150  Together, the CFTC 
and SEC regulate the vast majority of financial markets.  However, 
unlike the CFTC and FERC, the SEC does not have a limiting 
jurisdictional mandate.151  It is possible, however, that certain financial 
instruments that fall within the SEC’s jurisdiction could impact prices in 
physical energy markets.  That does not mean, however, that FERC 
would have jurisdiction over conduct that occurs within the SEC’s 
jurisdiction. 
For example, it is conceivable that illegal or manipulative short 
sales could adversely impact the price of a particular energy company’s 
                                                                                                                                
 146. See generally Markham, supra note 79, at 569–70. 
 147. Id. at 570. 
 148. See Brown-Hruska & Zwirb, supra note 68, at 5–6; see also In re Hunter 
Petitioner Brief, supra note 43, at 49. 
 149. See FERC Strategic Plan – FERC’s Mission, supra note 2, at 3. 
 150. See Securities Act of 1933 § 5, 15 U.S.C. § 77e (2006). 
 151. Demarest, supra note 13, at 479–80. 
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stock.  Market fears and concerns about energy supplies could cause 
energy prices to rise to artificial levels that do not reflect the realities of 
supply and demand.  Does this mean then that FERC is empowered to 
exercise jurisdiction over illegal or manipulative short sales?  Although 
the illegal or manipulative conduct may have impacted prices in 
physical markets, the SEC—not FERC—would retain jurisdiction over 
the matter.  FERC, however, would be empowered to correct the pricing 
anomalies to ensure that rates within its jurisdiction are “just and 
reasonable,” whereas the SEC would pursue claims against the 
wrongdoer. 
C. FERC’S ENCROACHMENT INTO FINANCIAL MARKETS TO POLICE 
MANIPULATION IS NOT IN THE PUBLIC INTEREST 
FERC’s encroachment into financial markets would result in 
unnecessary costs, duplicative regulation, potentially conflicting legal 
standards, and multi-agency enforcement actions for the same conduct.  
Surely, that is not a result that Congress intended when it delegated 
regulatory authority over financial markets.  In the futures markets, for 
example, Congress asserted that the CEA’s purpose was to serve the 
public interest through a system of effective self-regulation under the 
oversight of the CFTC which would, among other things, “deter and 
prevent price manipulation or any other disruptions to market 
integrity.”152  FERC itself has acknowledged that Congress delineated 
“the responsibility for developing a coherent regulatory program for the 
commodities industry and to prevent the costs and confusion associated 
with multiple regulators.”153   Similarly, Congress created the SEC to 
restrict speculation and abuses after it concluded that securities 
exchanges were used for “transactions producing moral and economic 
waste and corruption.”154   Thus, Congress created the CFTC and SEC 
as independent federal agencies to regulate distinct aspects of financial 
markets without overlapping jurisdiction, even though those markets 
have converged in certain respects.155 
FERC argues that its ability to police manipulation in financial 
markets is “necessary in the public interest or for the protection of 
                                                                                                                                
 152. 7 U.S.C. § 5(b) (2006). 
 153. New York Mercantile Exchange, 74 FERC ¶ 61,311 (1996). 
 154. H.R. REP. NO. 62-1593, at 47 (1913). 
 155. See generally Markham, supra note 79, at 552; Amicus Curiae Brief of Futures 
Industry Association, supra note 75, at 20. 
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natural gas ratepayers.”156  However, the court rejected that argument in 
Mobil Oil Corp. v. Federal Power Commission157 on the grounds that 
FERC’s expansive reading of the relevant statute did not comply with 
the jurisdictional limitations of NGA § 1(b).158  In fact, the court went so 
far as to commend FERC for attempting to protect its market, but stated, 
“it is not sufficient justification upon which to base an expansion of 
[FERC’s powers] to activities clearly not within its terms.”159 
FERC’s effort to police manipulation in financial markets is an 
encroachment that would provide yet another layer of complexity and 
confusion.  FERC’s mission is to ensure that the rates charged for 
wholesale sales of natural gas and electricity are “just and 
reasonable.”160  It is not a financial regulator and does not have the 
specialized skills that Congress requires of its financial markets 
regulators.161  Indeed, if FERC had jurisdiction in financial markets, it 
would lead to a slippery slope where other federal agencies could also 
claim jurisdiction within the financial landscape.  Surely, Congress did 
not intend to confound the regulatory landscape for financial markets 
and promote duplicative and conflicting regulation.  To do so would 
result in increased complexity and costs for market participants and 
federal regulators alike. 
Congress did not intend for federal agencies to compete for power 
and authority over regulated markets.162  To the contrary, where it was 
within the public’s interest, Congress created federal agencies to carry 
out specified functions and solve problems it had identified.163  Financial 
                                                                                                                                
 156. 15 U.S.C. § 717c-1 (2006). 
 157. 463 F.2d 256 (D.C. Cir. 1971). 
 158. Id. at 263. 
 159. Id. 
 160. FERC Strategic Plan – FERC’s Mission, supra note 2, at 6. 
 161. See Amicus Curiae Brief of Futures Industry Association, supra note 75, at 18. 
 162. In re Hunter Petitioner Brief, supra note 43, at 47. 
 163. For example, the CFTC was established as the federal regulatory agency for 
futures trading; the FERC was established to regulate interstate transmission of 
electricity, natural gas, and oil; the SEC administers federal securities laws that seek to 
protect investors, ensure securities markets are fair and honest, and provide the means 
to enforce securities laws through sanctions; the FTC’s mission is to enhance consumer 
welfare and protection competition, and prohibit business practices that are anti-
competitive, deceptive or unfair to consumers.  A host of other federal agencies exist, 
each with its own unique mission. For a complete list of federal agencies and their 
respective missions, see https://www.federalregister.gov/agencies. 
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markets regulators were not created with overlapping jurisdiction.164  
However, even where Congress determined that it was prudent to 
coordinate activities, it was done so with a view towards avoiding 
duplication and unnecessary costs, not increasing complexity and 
costs. 165   Any attempt by FERC to police manipulation in financial 
markets would be contrary to Congress’ intent and inconsistent with 
public policy because it would foster an environment polluted with 
conflicting legal standards, duplicative regulation, unnecessary costs, 
and unavoidable confusion. 
CONCLUSION 
FERC does not have, and should not have, authority to police 
manipulation in financial markets even if that conduct has an impact on 
prices in physical markets.  FERC’s authority is statutorily limited in 
scope.  FERC’s primary mission is to protect natural gas and electricity 
consumers from exploitation by natural gas companies and electric 
utilities and to ensure that rates charged for wholesale sales are just and 
reasonable.166  FERC was not created as a financial regulator and has no 
basis, statutory or otherwise, to encroach upon the jurisdiction of federal 
agencies charged with regulating financial markets, namely the CFTC 
and SEC.  Any attempts to extend FERC’s jurisdiction to financial 
markets would be inconsistent with public policy and undermine 
Congress’ intent to minimize duplicative oversight, conflicting agency 
regulations and rulings, and unnecessary costs. 
 
                                                                                                                                
 164. See Markham, supra note 79, at 569–70. 
 165. Id. at 589. 
 166. Horwich, supra note 29, at 366; see also Order Denying Rehearing, supra note 
1, at 62,069–70. 
